

## **Punishing Those Responsible for the Prison Abuses at Abu Ghraib: The Influence of the Negative Reciprocity Norm (NRN)**

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*The negative reciprocity norm (NRN) is the personal moral code specifying retaliation as a proper response to wrongdoing (Eisenberger, Lynch, Aselage, & Rohdieck, 2004). We examined the role of negative reciprocity in interpreting and reacting to the prison abuses at Abu Ghraib. Results showed that people who believed that American soldiers behaved wrongly at Abu Ghraib were more likely to view punishing the soldiers responsible as a highly moral response and were less likely to contribute money to a charitable organization that helps American soldiers. These relationships were only present among those highly endorsing the negative reciprocity norm.*

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**KEY WORDS:** motivated reasoning, reciprocity, negative reciprocity norm, political orientation, punishment

In the spring of 2004, the people of the United States learned of the abuse of Iraqi prisoners at the hands of American soldiers at Abu Ghraib. Photographs revealed that soldiers were stripping prisoners naked, forcing them to engage in humiliating sex acts, and subjecting them to torturous fear and intimidation tactics. Polls indicated that a large majority of Americans were concerned, upset, or angry

about the incidents (Langer, 2004). However, feelings concerning the American actions at Abu Ghraib have been in many ways split among the American public. For example, polls following the press release of the prison abuse photos indicated that Republicans were more likely than Democrats to believe that some physical abuse of war prisoners is acceptable (55% to 38%; Morris & Langer, 2004). Because the images of abuse were regularly shown in the media, an important research question for political psychologists is how the American public would react to witnessing these acts committed by American soldiers and what individual-level factors might explain differences in people's responses.

In this research, we propose that people's judgments about the morally appropriate way to respond to those involved in the Abu Ghraib prison abuses are influenced by whether they view American soldiers as having acted wrongly. We tested this argument by showing individuals several images from the Abu Ghraib prison that had been widely displayed by the media. The data were collected in 2004 when pictures of the abuse were still being widely disseminated. The present study was not an experiment but was designed to make the abuses salient and to facilitate our examination of people's reactions to these events. In addition to examining moral judgment, we also sought to learn how perceptions of the prison abuse and moral belief systems jointly influenced behavioral responses toward American soldiers.

Most people believe that punishment of a transgressor is an appropriate and moral response to wrongdoing (Tripp & Bies, 1997; Tripp, Bies, & Aquino, 2002). However, this assumes that the act committed by the transgressor is interpreted as being wrong. In the context of Abu Ghraib, it is reasonable to assume that people who interpret the abuses committed by American soldiers as acts of wrongdoing are more likely to judge punishing those involved (American soldiers) as a highly moral response. Conversely, people who interpret the acts as a justifiable response to a perceived enemy, and therefore not wrong, would view punishment of the troops involved as a less moral response.

In the face of shocking evidentiary photographs depicting abuse, what might lead some people to interpret the available information in such a way to conclude that the American soldiers' behavior was morally justifiable and therefore not wrong? Fiske, Harris, and Cuddy suggest that the perpetrators of the prison abuses (and perhaps their supporters) ". . . may see themselves as doing a great service by punishing and or eliminating a group they perceive as deserving ill treatment" (2004, p. 1483). If this assertion is valid, then some people may interpret the prison abuse as a just response to a prior wrongdoing (i.e., the 9/11 attacks, militant Iraqi attacks on U.S. troops). Similarly, Tripp and Bies (1997) examined the features that made people judge acts of vengeance as either morally good or morally bad. They found that avengers judged their own vengeful acts as *morally good* if the acts resulted in either a restoration of the avenger's status in comparison to the target or if the acts resulted in a correction of the target's behavior. Based on this analysis, it is possible that if people view the prison abuses as acts against an

enemy that restored the rightful balance of power, they would be more likely to judge the soldiers' behavior as morally good.

Nonetheless, Tripp and Bies (1997) warned that vengeful acts could be judged as *morally bad* either when the acts hurt innocent people or provoked further attacks from the targets. Thus, other people interpreting the events at Abu Ghraib may be inclined to view the soldiers' acts as morally wrong for two main reasons: (1) the lack of evidence implicating Iraq in the attacks of 9/11; and (2) the acts of militants following the release of the Abu Ghraib photos, such as the beheading of Nicholas Berg, that have been ostensibly described by some as retaliation for the abuses (Kinzer & Rutenberg, 2004). For those interpreting the abuses at Abu Ghraib as wrong, punishment of those responsible for them should be judged as a morally appropriate response.

*H1:* The more people believe that American soldiers behaved wrongly at Abu Ghraib the more likely they will judge the punishment of the soldiers as a moral response.

Hypothesis 1 deals with how perceptions of wrongdoing affect moral judgment. However, it is also possible that these perceptions influence behavior. Accordingly, we also explore whether the extent to which individuals view the American soldiers as having acted wrongly at Abu Ghraib would influence their willingness to provide financial support to an organization that benefits U.S. soldiers. Fisk et al. argue that, in addition to the direct perpetrators of the prison abuse, ". . . we should also hold responsible peers and superiors who control the social context" (2004, p. 1482). From this perspective, the incidents at Abu Ghraib were not isolated, idiosyncratic acts. Rather, they were aided and abetted by an entire military system in which individuals condoned such behaviors and may have turned a blind eye to the goings-on. For some people, the belief that the Americans acted badly at Abu Ghraib may extend to the entire system that encouraged and tolerated its occurrence.

In this study, we provided participants with actual money to allocate to three different charities (United Services Organization (USO), Amnesty International, The Global Fund for AIDS; see appendix for descriptions of the organizations given to participants). By allocating money to the USO, people would be giving direct financial support to an organization that benefits U.S. troops and their families. Alternatively, by choosing to allocate money to the other organizations, a person could withhold support for U.S. troops which, we argue, would be directly motivated by their perceptions that the Abu Ghraib abuses were wrong. Specifically, we theorize that people who see American soldiers as wrongdoers should be less willing to provide their support to an organization that benefits those responsible for the prison abuses.

*H2:* The more people believe that American soldiers behaved wrongly at Abu Ghraib the less they will favor the USO in an allocation task.

### The Moderating Role of Endorsement of the Negative Reciprocity Norm

In his film *Munich*, director Steven Spielberg dramatizes the Israeli government's response to the terrorist group Black September which held 11 Israeli athletes hostage during the 1972 Summer Olympics. The hostages were later killed by the terrorists. In the movie, and in the controversial book *Vengeance* (Jonas, 2005) on which it is based, the Israeli government decides to carry out a plan to assassinate all of those held responsible for planning the hostage taking. This action is ostensibly an act of revenge carried out against a perceived transgressor. Nonetheless, when placed in a situation where one has been wronged, people (and governments) do not always retaliate. For instance, one may fear counterretaliation from the other party (Tripp et al., 2002). But when revenge can be carried out with little or no cost to the would-be avenger, then the decision to seek revenge is likely to be influenced by a person's beliefs about the moral appropriateness of this response to a wrong. In this study, we examined a morality-based belief system that has not received attention in political psychology: the endorsement of the negative reciprocity norm (NRN; Gouldner, 1960).

Gouldner (1960) described the NRN as involving a unitary set of beliefs favoring retaliation as the correct and proper way to respond to unfavorable treatment. The use of the NRN as a moral precept is deeply entrenched in human history. For example, the famed Code of Hammurabi and the Book of Exodus imply that justice may be gained "eye for eye" (Eisenberger et al., 2004). Despite this deep rooting, endorsement of the NRN may be viewed more as a personality factor, being espoused by and guiding the decision of some people more than others (Eisenberger et al., 2004).

While the NRN is a relatively underexamined phenomenon with, to date, little direct application to the political sphere, the norm demonstrates some similarities to other variables of interest in political psychology, such as right-wing authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1981, 1998) and social dominance orientation (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1999). RWA refers to a willingness to submit to legitimate authority and a general tendency toward authority-sanctioned aggressiveness. NRN endorsement is similar in that it has been shown to be related to dispositional anger and aggressive reactions (Eisenberger et al., 2004). However, high-NRN individuals are not likely to subjugate themselves to an authority perceived as bullying. For instance, research suggests the existence of negative reciprocity in subordinate-supervisor relationships in work organizations, characterized by an exchange of injuries, little concern for mutual interests, and lower levels of subordinate performance (Uhl-bien & Maslyn, 2003).

SDO refers to the extent to which one justifies the stratification of society into dominant and subordinate groups (Pratto et al., 1994). Relatedly, endorsement of the NRN has been shown to have a weak but significant relationship with need for dominance as a personality trait ( $r = .11$ ; Eisenberger et al., 2004). And like being

high in SDO, NRN endorsement would give people justification for using aggression against undesirable groups. However, individuals high in NRN endorsement would not necessarily approve of or defend group-based stratification systems. For those high in NRN endorsement, retaliation is based upon perceptions of prior negative interactions rather than global perceptions of proper group stratification. Therefore, it seems that endorsement of the NRN has its own niche in the political sphere, with relatively small overlap with other concepts.

Eisenberger et al. (2004) demonstrated that the NRN is conceptually and empirically distinct from a positive norm of reciprocity. They also showed that endorsing NRN has behavioral consequences. Specifically, following mistreatment from another individual Eisenberger et al. (2004) found that female college students who strongly endorsed the NRN were angrier, disagreed more, and ridiculed their partners more than did female students who weakly endorsed this norm. Additionally, Perugini, Gallucci, Presaghi, & Ercolani (2003) found that individuals high in NRN endorsement were more likely than their low NRN counterparts to withhold tokens in an allocation task to punish an imaginary partner who had previously treated them negatively.

Eisenberger and colleagues (2004) suggest that the degree to which endorsing the NRN results in negative behaviors directed against a harm-doer depends upon the actual perception that wrongdoing occurred. Similarly, Perugini et al. (2003) suggest that high-NRN endorsers may be especially attuned to negative treatment so that they will know whether it is proper to retaliate. Accordingly, we theorize that the perception of the prison abuse as wrong will interact with NRN endorsement. Among high-NRN individuals, those perceiving wrongdoing at the hands of Americans will be especially likely to endorse the morality of punishing the soldiers responsible for the abuses and to withhold financial support from an organization that benefits American soldiers.

*H3:* The positive relationship between the interpretation of the Abu Ghraib abuses as acts of wrongdoing and the belief in the morality of punishing the American soldiers responsible will be stronger for those strongly endorsing the NRN than for those weakly endorsing the norm.

*H4:* The negative relationship between the interpretation of the Abu Ghraib abuse as a wrongdoing and the withholding of financial support for the USO will be stronger for those strongly endorsing the NRN than for those weakly endorsing the norm.

## Method

The sample consisted of 138 community residents, students, and staff from a northeastern university. Two subjects were excluded from analyses because they did not fill out portions of the questionnaire. Forty-three percent were female. The

average age of participants was 24.2. The sample was 45.6% white, 12.5% African-American, 32.4% Asian, and 9.6% Latino/Hispanic.

### *Procedure*

Participants were recruited through flyers posted in the neighborhood around the university. They were paid \$10 to participate in 45 minutes to one hour of various research tasks in a summer behavioral research lab. Upon entering the lab, they were told that they would be participating in a number of different studies. In the first task, respondents completed a number of different scales. As part of this task, subjects indicated their political orientation and answered questions assessing their belief in the NRN (Eisenberger et al., 2004). Next, participants viewed a slide show consisting of 11 pictures taken from the Abu Ghraib prison scandal, presented on screen to subjects at four seconds per picture. Following the slide show, participants received a second questionnaire assessing their beliefs in the extent to which American soldiers behaved badly and their belief in the morality of punishing those responsible for Abu Ghraib, among other items not relevant to the current study. Participants then completed a filler task, which included items evaluating their opinions about current events. These items were not of direct interest to the present study. At the end of the session, participants completed a resource allocation task in which we attempted to capture a measure of actual behavior. Participants were then debriefed, remunerated, and thanked for their participation.

*Interpretation of Wrongdoing.* Interpretation of Abu Ghraib as a wrongdoing was assessed via three items developed for the current study (see appendix). Subjects indicated their extent of agreement with the items on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = Completely Disagree, 7 = Completely Agree). An example item is: "Compared to the mandates prescribed by the Geneva Convention (the international rules for detaining prisoners of war), American troops treated Iraqi prisoners badly." For this scale,  $\alpha = .65$ .

*Negative Reciprocity Norm Endorsement.* Belief in the NRN was assessed using the 14-item negative reciprocity norm scale developed by Eisenberger et al. (2004). Although this scale is relatively new, it has shown discriminatory and confirmatory validity (Eisenberger et al., 2004). Subjects responded using a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). In our sample, the 14-item scale was reduced to 12 items because the two negatively worded items loaded poorly on the factor. The items used for this study are shown in the appendix. A sample item is: "If someone treats you badly, you should treat that person badly in return." The NRN scale had high reliability ( $\alpha = .93$ ).

*Morality of Punishment.* The morality of punishing those responsible for Abu Ghraib was measured using two items (see appendix). Subjects responded to the items on a 5-point Likert scale regarding their opinion of the morality of potential actions that could be taken against those responsible for the abuses at Abu Ghraib

(1 = Extremely Unmoral, 5 = Extremely Moral). A sample item is: "Prosecute those responsible for the Iraqi prisoner abuse to the fullest extent of the law." For this scale,  $\alpha = .80$ .

*Allocation Task.* Subjects were handed three envelopes and four one-dollar bills. The envelopes were labeled as Amnesty International, Global Fund, or United Services Organization (USO). Subjects were given brief descriptions of the three organizations (see appendix; the order of appearance of the descriptions changed for each subject) and instructed to donate their dollars to the three organizations as they saw fit. The researchers recorded participant allocation of monies to each of these charities. As noted earlier, we presumed that allocating money to the USO rather than any of the other two options indicates support for the U.S. troops. Alternatively, allocating money to Amnesty International would indicate less support for troops and may even indicate support for the supposed victims of Abu Ghraib given that Amnesty International is an organization devoted to protecting the rights of prisoners around the world. We introduced the Global Fund as a neutral third option where the funds allocated would directly go to aid in the treatment of HIV in foreign countries. We reasoned that this option would allow people to demonstrate their lack of support for the U.S. military while not necessarily indicating support for the rights of prisoners like those at Abu Ghraib. Our dependent measure was the donation bias favoring the USO. This was calculated by subtracting the money subjects donated to the other two charities from the amount they designated for the USO. Thus, positive values indicate a donation bias favoring the USO.

*Control Variable: Political Orientation.* Polls taken during the war showed that Republicans and Democrats tend to differ in their opinions of the Iraq war and of the prison abuse at Abu Ghraib (Infield, 2004; Morris & Langer, 2004); hence, we controlled for political orientation when testing our hypotheses. We measured this construct by asking participants to indicate their political orientation on a scale ranging from 1 (extremely conservative) to 7 (extremely liberal).

## Results

We used hierarchical regression analyses to test our hypotheses. Preliminary analyses showed that demographic variables (gender, race) were not significantly related to our dependent measures. We excluded them from subsequent analyses to preserve degrees of freedom. Table 1 shows the correlations among all the study variables.

Table 2 shows the results of the hierarchical regression analyses testing all hypotheses. In Step 1, we regressed the two dependent variables—morality of punishment and favoring the USO—on political orientation. Political orientation accounted for 4% of the variance in the belief in the morality of punishing the American soldiers. Inspection of the regression weights revealed that increased liberalism was positively related to beliefs in the morality of punishment ( $\beta = .19$ ).

**Table 1.** Means, Standard Deviations, Alpha Reliabilities, and Intercorrelations among Variables

Variable	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3	4	5
1. Political Orientation	4.53	1.36	–				
2. Interpretation of Wrongdoing	5.53	1.20	.29**	(.65)			
3. Negative Reciprocity Endorsement	2.33	.79	–.04	–.14	(.93)		
4. Morality of Punishing Soldiers	4.20	1.05	.19*	.32**	.01	(.80)	
5. Allocation Favoring USO	–2.46	1.98	–.36**	–.30**	.13	–.36**	–

*Note.* Alpha reliabilities are reported on the diagonal. For political orientation, 1 = extremely conservative and 7 = extremely liberal. For Allocation Favoring USO, positive values represent giving more money to the USO than to the other charities. Negative values indicate giving more money to the other charities than to the USO.

\**p* < .05. \*\**p* < .01.

**Table 2.** Hierarchical Regression Results for Mediation and Moderation Analyses

Step	Variable	Morality of Punishment			USO Allocation Bias		
		Stand. Beta	<i>t</i>	R <sup>2</sup> change	Stand. Beta	<i>t</i>	R <sup>2</sup> change
1	Political orientation	.19	2.27*	.04*	–.38	4.70**	.14**
2	Political orientation	.11	1.28	.08**	–.31	3.82**	.05**
	Interpretation of wrongdoing (W)	.29	3.40**		–.23	2.77**	
3	Political orientation	.11	1.28	.002	–.31	3.84**	.01
	Interpretation of wrongdoing (W)	.30	3.44**		–.21	2.58*	
	Negative Reciprocity Norm Endorsement (N)	.05	.56		.11	1.34	
4	Political orientation	.10	1.21	.03*	–.30	3.83**	.05**
	Interpretation of wrongdoing (W)	.27	3.12**		–.18	2.17*	
	Negative Reciprocity Norm Endorsement (N)	.05	.63		.10	1.30	
	(W) × (N)	.17	2.09*		–.23	2.98**	

*Note:* \**p* < .05. \*\**p* < .01

Increased liberalism was negatively related to favoring the USO in the allocation task ( $\beta = -.38$ ). Political orientation accounted for 14% of the variance in allocation bias.


In Step 2, we entered the interpretation of Abu Ghraib as an act of wrongdoing. This variable was positively related to judgments of the morality of punishing those responsible for Abu Ghraib ( $\beta = .29$ ) and negatively related to the allocations




favoring the USO ( $\beta = -.23$ ). These results support Hypotheses 1 and 2, respectively. NRN was entered in Step 3. It showed no direct relationship to any of the dependent variables, which was expected given our prediction that it would act as moderator of the relationship between perceptions of wrongdoing and the dependent measures.

We tested the effects of the interaction between belief in the Americans' wrongdoing at Abu Ghraib and endorsement of the NRN in Step 4 of the hierarchical regression. Both the perception of wrongdoing and NRN were centered on their means for the calculation of the interaction term. As predicted in Hypotheses 3 and 4, significant effects were observed for each outcome (see Table 2). These effects are displayed graphically in Figures 1 and 2.

Figure 1 shows that at high levels of NRN endorsement, the perception of wrongdoing was positively related to judging the punishment of the soldiers as a moral response (High and low NRN are respectively 1 *SD* above and below the mean; Aiken & West, 1991). Simple slopes tests reveal that the relationship for high NRN endorsers was significant, ( $t(131) = 4.05, p < .01$ ). Conversely, the moral judgments of people who weakly endorsed NRN were not influenced by interpretations of wrongdoing, ( $t(131) = .96, p = ns$ ). Hypothesis 3 was therefore supported.



**Figure 1.** Interpretation of Wrongdoing by Negative Reciprocity Endorsement on Belief in the Morality of Punishing the Troops Responsible for Abu Ghraib. High and low NRN are, respectively, 1 *SD* above and 1 *SD* below the mean.



**Figure 2.** Interpretation of Wrongdoing by Negative Reciprocity Endorsement on Favoring the USO (Positive numbers indicate more money allocated to the USO than to other charities). High and low NRN are, respectively, 1 *SD* above and 1 *SD* below the mean.

Figure 2 depicts the relationship between interpretation of the actions at Abu Ghraib as wrongdoing and bias towards the USO in the allocation task (high and low NRN are respectively 1 *SD* above and below the mean). Simple slope tests showed that the interpretation of wrongdoing was related to USO allocation bias among individuals with high NRN endorsement ( $t(131) = -3.89, p < .01$ ) but not among those with low NRN endorsement ( $t(131) = .26, p = ns$ ). This pattern supports Hypothesis 4 because it indicates that perception of American wrongdoing was negatively related to supporting the USO only among those who highly endorsed the NRN.

## Discussion

Endorsement of revenge is typically thought of as an individual phenomenon that guides reactions to interpersonal slights (Eisenberger et al., 2004; Perugini et al., 2003). The present study suggests that people's endorsement of negative reciprocity may also affect perceptions of and reactions to political events. The interpretation that Americans behaved wrongly at Abu Ghraib was positively related to viewing punishment of those responsible as a moral option and nega-

tively related to an allocation bias favoring U.S. soldiers. However, these relationships were only present among individuals who highly endorsed the negative reciprocity norm.

The results of the present study suggest that the interpretation of wrongdoing itself is not enough to explain all of the variation in moral judgments or behaviors that indicate support or opposition to political goals. Rather, what is also needed is a consideration of underlying psychological variables, such as normative belief systems, that may influence how interpretations of political events are translated into judgment and action. As Tripp and Bies (1997) point out, revenge can be viewed as either morally right or morally wrong. What we add to their observation is an individual-level psychological explanation for why these different judgments might occur.

Past research (Eisenberger et al., 2004) has shown an increased tendency among high-NRN endorsers to respond to interpersonal attacks with anger and insults. The current study extends this line of research into the political arena. What our findings suggest is that high-NRN endorsers take a calculative approach to evaluating issues of punishment and endorsing and exacting punishment only to the extent that a wrongdoing is perceived. An interesting pattern also emerged among those with weaker endorsement of the NRN; they endorsed and levied consistent punishment regardless of the amount of wrongdoing perceived. Figures 1 and 2 seem to reveal a conflicting message with those who weakly endorse the NRN supporting and enacting punishment more than those highly endorsing the NRN. However, we caution readers to remember that we found no main effect for NRN endorsement on the outcomes. Additionally, our hypotheses concerned the *strength* of relationships and not their absolute levels. Taken at face value, the graphs actually indicate that, controlling for political orientation, low-NRN endorsers are neutral in regards to the appropriateness of punishment. In Figure 1, low-NRN endorsers consistently believe in the morality of punishing the troops, but this consistency lies along the neutral point of the outcome scale (3). In Figure 2, low-NRN endorsers again appear consistent in levying financial punishment to the soldiers. However, their pattern may not indicate consistent “punishment” at all. Rather, a value of around (-1) on this outcome indicates a situation where individuals are assigning a fairly proportional (around 33%) amount of funds to the USO, compared to the other two organizations. In addition, our results indicate that high-NRN endorsers may not necessarily be “vindictive” people. Specifically, the results suggest that these individuals seem more willing to emphasize the *immorality* of punishing “innocent” people than their low-NRN counterparts. Perhaps high-NRN endorsers view undeserved punishment as an especially egregious violation of their moral code. Low-NRN endorsers may espouse other values that guide their beliefs in and enactment of punishment.

This pattern of results has some interesting implications for political issues like capital punishment. Specifically, people’s support for capital punishment may

be partly driven by their endorsement of NRN. It may be that to live up to their principle of “an eye for an eye” by defending capital punishment, high-NRN endorsers may have a strong need to believe that a perpetrator truly did wrong. Low-NRN endorsers may not feel the same compulsion to make sure justice is appropriately applied since they are more willing to violate or make exceptions to the NRN.

### *Limitations and Conclusion*

The current study supported several hypotheses, but it has some limitations. First, this study used a cross-sectional as opposed to an experimental design. Instead of manipulating variables, we aimed to take a snapshot of individuals’ reactions to the Abu Ghraib abuses. This feature of the design leaves the causal ordering of our variables open to question. Nonetheless, the complex moderation analyses in the present study provide preliminary evidence of the causal pathways suggested. Future evidence, possibly involving experimental designs or longitudinal data, is recommended to further substantiate our findings. Additionally, the context for the study was a particularly vivid and powerful one. It therefore raises the question of whether our hypotheses would be supported for events that may have less emotional impact or historical significance. This is obviously a question that only future studies can address.

What our study adds to the political literature is a relatively unexamined variable—the endorsement of the negative reciprocity norm—that may influence a variety of political attitudes, cognitions, and behaviors. Interpretations of and reactions to the prison abuses at Abu Ghraib represent a microcosm of the myriad political judgments that could be influenced by one’s belief in retaliation as a moral alternative. Nonetheless, the findings of the current study provide a preliminary glimpse into the complex role that moral attitudes toward retaliation play in political opinion and decision making.

## **APPENDIX**

### *Interpretation of Wrongdoing*

- 1) American soldiers involved in the Iraqi prisoner abuse scandal desecrated Iraqi tradition when they should have respected the traditions of the Iraqi prisoners.
- 2) American soldiers who violated the dignity of Iraqi prisoners should have treated the Iraqi prisoners with decency.
- 3) Compared to the mandates prescribed by the Geneva Convention (the international rules for detaining prisoners of war), American troops treated Iraqi prisoners badly.

*Endorsement of Negative Reciprocity Norm*

- 1) If someone dislikes you, you should dislike them.
- 2) If a person despises you, you should despise them.
- 3) If someone says something nasty to you, you should say something nasty back.
- 4) If a person wants to be your enemy, you should treat them like an enemy.
- 5) If someone treats me badly, I feel I should treat them even worse.
- 6) If someone treats you badly, you should treat that person badly in return.
- 7) A person who has contempt for you deserves your contempt.
- 8) If someone important to you does something negative to you, you should do something even more negative to them.
- 9) If someone treats you like an enemy, they deserve your resentment.
- 10) When someone hurts you, you should find a way they won't know about to get even.
- 11) You should not give help to those who treat you badly.
- 12) If someone distrusts you, you should distrust them.

*Morality of Punishment*

- 1) Prosecute those responsible for the Iraqi prisoner abuse to the fullest extent of the law.
- 2) Use any means necessary to identify all soldiers and officials responsible for the Iraqi prisoner abuse and give them dishonorable discharges or force them to resign.

*Allocation Organizations*

*The Global Fund.* The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria was created to dramatically increase resources to fight three of the world's most devastating diseases and to direct those resources to areas of greatest need. As a partnership between governments, civil society, the private sector, and affected communities, the Global Fund represents an innovative approach to international health financing. The Global Fund's purpose is to attract, manage, and disburse resources to fight AIDS, TB, and malaria. They do not implement programs directly, relying instead on the knowledge of local experts.

*The United Services Organization.* The USO (United Service Organizations) is chartered by Congress as a nonprofit, charitable corporation. It is not a part of the U.S. Government. The USO is endorsed by the President of the United States and the Department of Defense. The USO mission is to provide morale, welfare, and recreation-type services to uniformed military personnel. The original intent of Congress—and enduring style of USO delivery—is to represent the American people by extending a touch of home to the military. The USO relies solely on the

generosity of the general public. More than 12,000 members in the USO international corps of volunteers provide an estimated 450,000 hours of service annually, a worldwide personal contribution of over \$3 million.

*Amnesty International.* Amnesty International (AI) is a worldwide movement of people who campaign for internationally recognized human rights. AI's vision is of a world in which every person enjoys all of the human rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights standards. In pursuit of this vision, AI's mission is to undertake research and action focused on preventing and ending grave abuses of the rights to physical and mental integrity, freedom of conscience and expression, and freedom from discrimination, within the context of its work to promote all human rights.

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