American Reed II, Karl Aquino, & Eric Levy

Moral Identity and Judgments of Charitable Behaviors

In several studies, the authors examine the potential to leverage a consumer’s moral identity to enhance brand and company identification and promote goodwill through community relations. Studies 1a and 1b show that even when opportunity costs are equivalent (subjectively or economically), consumers who also have a highly self-important moral identity perceive the act of giving time versus money as more moral and self-expressive. The authors extend these findings to self-reported preferences and establish boundary conditions in two additional studies. Consumers with higher organizational status prefer to give money versus time, but this preference is weaker for those with a highly self-important moral identity (Study 2), and the preference for giving time versus money is more likely to emerge when the moral self is primed and the time given has a moral purpose (Study 3).

Individual and corporate financial donations in the United States amount to more than $241 billion per year (see the American Association of Fundraising Counsel’s Web site at http://www.aafrc.org). The volunteering of time generates services valued at more than $272 billion annually. Approximately 40,000 organizations are able to exist because of consumers who are willing to give time as an inexpensive and free labor source (Fisher and Ackerman 1998; Independent Sector 1992; Kotler 1982). Indeed, some consumer needs can be met only when time is given by others, such as volunteers who provide companionship, inspiration, and emotional support at organizations such as Big Brothers/Big Sisters (e.g., Clary et al. 1998). Marketing’s long history of concern with social welfare through consumer exchange (Bagozzi 1974, 1975; Gundlach and Murphy 1993) and corporate social responsibility (Drumwright 1999; Handelman and Arnold 1999; Klein, Smith, and John 2004; Lichtenstein, Drumwright, and Braig 2004; Robin and Reidenbach 1987) makes consumer perceptions of and preferences for qualitatively different types of donation behavior important research issues.

Although charities are faced with a consistent need for services, shrinking government support and competition make it more challenging to encourage donation (Bendapudi, Singh, and Bendapudi 1996). The question of how nonprofit organizations should request help and what type of help to request is critical. Along these lines, Rothschild (1979, p. 11) notes the incongruities of nonprofits that try to “sell brotherhood like soap.” Although some research in marketing has examined charitable promotion strategy (Bendapudi, Singh, and Bendapudi 1996), little empirical research has explored the solicitation of time versus money (cf. Reed, Aquino, and Levy 2007). Brand equity benefits may accrue to organizations that encourage the donation of time. A corporation that mobilizes its employees to donate company time (rather than money) may be perceived as being more community centric, expending more effort, and being a better corporate citizen. Identifying social-psychological factors that might motivate consumers to volunteer time could have considerable practical value.

The intended contribution of this article can be divided into two parts: (1) We test core ideas about an understudied psychological construct (i.e., moral identity) and judgments of charitable behaviors, and (2) we extend the implications of these ideas to self-reported preferences for such behaviors (giving time versus money). We present an overview of the empirical work in Figure 1.

We explore whether moral identity is related to judgments of and self-reported preferences for giving time versus money. In each study, we use different ways to equate the two resources to hold their “value” constant. In Study 1a, we ask participants about their perceptions of giving time versus money after having them place a subjective dollar value on their time. Study 1a shows that consumers who have a highly self-important moral identity are more likely to perceive giving time (versus money) as a relatively moral act (i.e., caring, moral, socially responsible, and heartfelt). People with a highly self-important moral identity also find the act of giving time versus money to be relatively more self-expressive. Study 1b shows that these kinds of perceptions extend to hypothetical corporations. The contribution of these two studies is that they examine judgments about equivalent charitable behaviors as a function of a potentially important internal factor. Although these core ideas have not been previously tested in both marketing and social psychology, they are not surprising. However, they are the foundation for the main empirical contribution of this arti-
FIGURE 1
Overview of Empirical Work

Studies 1a and 1b

Charitable Behaviors

Time

Money

Differences in perceived morality and self-expressivity

Subjectively and economically equivalent behaviors

Studies 2 and 3 extend social identity research by testing relationships among the self-importance of moral identity, preferences for charitable giving (time versus money), and the boundary conditions of these relationships.

Conceptual Framework

Giving Time Versus Money

Researchers define “moral behavior” as behavior that is socially responsive to the needs of others (Gilligan 1982; Kohlberg 1969; Rest 1979). Thus, a consumer who donates time and one who gives money both engage in moral behavior. However, some economic theories would predict consumer indifference between making a monetary donation to a cause and giving time to that cause if the two resources are equivalent in “value.” For example, if a person believes that his or her time is “worth” $50 per hour and is asked to choose between donating $200 to a charitable organization and spending four hours of time to assist that charity, he or she should be indifferent between these choices, all else being equal. However, recent behavioral decision theory has suggested that effort directed toward some stimulus (e.g., task, goal, good) is psychologically different from spending the same amount of money (Kruger et al. 2004; Morales 2005; Thaler 1981).

Researchers have demonstrated that a common attribution (assuming that no other information is salient to undermine this inference) is that effort implies confidence in a cause/product (Kirmani 1990; Kirmani and Wright 1989), especially under conditions of indeterminable or ambiguous product quality (Kruger et al. 2004). When products or services appear similar, the cue of greater firm effort may lead to more favorable consumer perceptions (Kirmani 1990; Kirmani and Wright 1989). Another important distinction is the difference between doing and paying. Whereas exerting effort often leads to different inferences about motivation (Bandura and Cervone 1986) and/or internal value (Kirmani 1990), giving money does not necessarily trigger similar inferences. In some cases, giving money leads to negative attributions (Morales 2005; Webley and Wilson 1989). For
example, a consumer may view corporate tax-efficient giving as cold and detached. Furthermore, Morales’s (2005) work shows that exerting effort indicates that a consumer cares more about the activity or cause. These ideas set the stage for testing some key ideas in this article. A purpose of Study 1a and Study 1b was to conduct a simple test to examine people’s perceptions of giving time versus money when the value of the two resources are equivalent:

H1: When the value of the two resources is held constant, consumers will perceive giving time (giving money) to an organization that provides a social good as a moral (less moral) act.

These arguments are consistent with Morales’s (2005) and others’ (e.g., Kruger et al. 2004) findings about the utility derived from effort in situations in which the giving of time and money is perceived as equivalent in value. However, we build on their work by examining internal psychological factors (i.e., a consumer’s moral identity) that might influence perceptions of and preferences for giving time versus money.

The Definition of a Consumer’s Moral Identity
Aquino and Reed (2002) propose that people possess a cognitive schema of the moral self that is organized around a set of moral trait associations. Aquino and Reed’s trait-based definition of moral identity builds on the work of other writers (e.g., Brewer and Gardner 1996); they argue that traits are the loci of self-definition around which personal identities are structured. We adopt this definition of moral identity as a mental representation (i.e., a self-image) that a consumer may hold about his or her moral character (see Aquino and Reed 2002). For example, a consumer may possess in his or her mind a typical exemplar of what a moral person is like in terms of characteristics (e.g., being kind, honest, and loving), feelings (e.g., showing concern or empathy for others), and behaviors (e.g., helping strangers, engaging in charitable behaviors). A consumer’s moral identity (the extent to which this image is an important part of his or her self-concept) may motivate choices and the pursuit of actions that demonstrate social responsiveness to the needs of others.

This connection between how a person views him- or herself and the connection to his or her preferences for different kinds of behavior is an orientation that many psychologists and moral philosophers consider critical to the definition of morality. For example, Damon and Hart (1992, p. 455, emphasis added) argue that “there are both theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that the centrality of morality to self may be the single most powerful determinant of concordance between moral judgment and conduct…. People whose self-concept is organized around their moral beliefs are highly likely to translate those beliefs into action consistently throughout their lives.” For some consumers, moral identity is both the antecedent and the outcome of the need for self-consistency between who a person thinks he or she is and how he or she acts in the world (Blasi 1993).

However, consumers have multiple identities (Markus and Kunda 1986), and some identities are more important than others to the self. We expect that moral identity is more likely to regulate judgments (e.g., perceptions of charitable behaviors) when it is relatively more top of mind (i.e., temporarily salient) and/or when it is relatively more important to a consumer’s self-concept (i.e., self-important).

The Self-Importance of Moral Identity as a Moderator of Judgments of Giving Time Versus Money
Social identity can influence a person’s judgments, choices, behavior, and performance when it becomes salient, self-important (i.e., strength of identification), and relevant to the decision (e.g., Reed 2004). Moreover, identity-based judgments tend to be resistant to change (Bolton and Reed 2004). Salient and self-important identities trigger consumers to process information and engage in behaviors that they believe to be consistent with that identity (Forehand, Deshpandé, and Reed 2002). For example, advertisements targeted at different racial groups make consumers who are members of these groups pay more attention, especially if their racial identity is made salient (Forehand, Deshpandé, and Reed 2002). Building on this research, we propose that when a consumer’s moral identity (Aquino and Reed 2002) is highly salient or self-important, his or her sensitivity to acts that are consistent with moral identity increases.

Because giving time more directly involves the self, a consumer with a relatively highly self-important moral identity should make a different inference about giving time versus money. Consumers with a relatively highly self-important moral identity should react differentially toward charitable acts, even if the acts are equivalent in value. The self-importance of moral identity should directly influence a consumer’s perceptions of giving time versus donating money such that giving time will trigger a stronger moral inference. We test this possibility in the following hypothesis:

H2: When the value of the two resources is held constant, consumers will perceive giving time (giving money) to an organization that provides a social good as a moral (less moral) act. This effect will be stronger for consumers who have a relatively highly self-important moral identity.

The rationale for this hypothesis is as follows: To the extent that moral identity takes on high importance within a consumer’s overall self-definition, acts that are more expressive of the goals, values, and attitudes implied in this identity (e.g., giving time) should be evaluated differently from those that are comparatively less self-expressive (e.g., giving money). Conversely, if moral identity holds little or no importance in a consumer’s overall self-definition, he or she should be largely insensitive to expressing preferences for different kinds of moral behaviors that are equivalent in value. As a result, the notion that giving time represents a greater investment of self than donating money should matter little to a consumer with a relatively less self-important moral identity because these two acts may be viewed as qualitatively similar.

Because the giver and beneficiary need never, and often do not, interact, consumers with a relatively highly self-important moral identity should perceive monetary donations as impersonal, indirect, and passive and, thus, a less
moral way of providing a social benefit to others. However, giving time more intimately connects the giver to the receiver. At the very least, giving time connects the giver to others who provide the social good directly. Therefore, giving time constitutes a greater psychic and behavioral investment of the self than giving money, especially for those with a highly self-important moral identity.

Finally, consumers who have a highly self-important moral identity should report stronger psychological affiliation toward acts that reinforce their moral self-concepts (i.e., acts that are consistent with their moral identity and are self-expressive of their morality). If the arguments presented thus far are valid—that is, a consumer with a highly self-important moral identity perceives giving time versus money as a more moral act—it follows that consumers whose moral identity has high (versus low) self-importance should also believe that giving time is a relatively more self-expressive act, even when the two acts are equivalent in value. The following hypothesis tests this idea:

H3: When the value of the two resources is held constant, consumers with a relatively more self-important moral identity will perceive the act of giving time (versus money) as relatively more self-expressive.

The rationale for this hypothesis is rooted in the attitude function literature. Prior work has argued that people hold and report an attitude because the attitude serves a “social adjustment function” (Smith, Bruner, and White 1956, p. 42). In other words, the attitude enables the person to connect and identify with others who also share that same attitude. This connection also results in a stronger sense of identification (i.e., psychological affiliation and liking) with behaviors that reflect the particular social identity (Shavitt 1990). Across the first three studies, we used Aquino and Reed’s (2002) empirically validated measure of the chronic self-importance of moral identity to examine whether this facet of the self predicts judgments of and preferences for charitable behaviors that are equivalent in value.

**Study 1a: Perceptions of Equivalent Charitable Behaviors**

**Method**

*Sample and procedures.* Study 1a tested the influence of the self-importance of consumers’ moral identity (measured as a covariate) on their perceptions of equivalent charitable behaviors. The convenience sample consisted of 242 undergraduate students, administrative staff, and local area community residents who participated in a one-hour session in which they were compensated for completing several research tasks. Of those who reported demographics, 39% were men, 46% were Caucasian, 7% were African American, 39% were Asian, 3% were Hispanic, and 5% self-reported as “other”; the average age was 22.31 years (SD = 7.16).

The study was cross-sectional and consisted of several ostensibly unrelated tasks. For the first task, participants completed a short prequestionnaire on general self-perceptions and opinions. Embedded in this questionnaire were items that measured participants’ self-importance of their moral identity (we describe this subsequently).

Participants then completed a study on their perceptions of charitable giving. After participants read the scenario and answered the questions to the best of their ability (there were no right or wrong answers), they were prompted with the following:

1. How much free leisure time do you usually have per week? Please write an hour amount: ______.
2. How much money is this free time worth to you? In other words, how much would you be willing to pay to keep this free time? Please write a dollar amount: ______.
3. Now consider these two acts of donation:
   - Giving your leisure to helping out at the Charity of your choice the number of hours that you wrote in response to Question 1.
   - Giving an equivalent amount of money to the Charity of your choice in the amount of money that you wrote in response to Question 2.

Now, assume that the Charity of your choice that hypothetically receives either of these two gifts has NO preference toward which “type of help” they receive.

In other words, the amount of time donated OR the money donated is an amount such that the Charity of your choice is able to more than cover gross wage expenses, benefits, and transaction costs for hiring for its staffing needs.

After reading this scenario, participants responded to several items that assessed their perceptions of the self-expressiveness of giving money (the number they wrote down) and giving time (again, the number they wrote down). Participants then responded to questions that measured the moral inferences made about giving time versus money. Finally, we asked participants whether they thought about the costs (noted in the scenario) born by the charitable organization when they were answering the question.

**Measures.** Drawing on Erikson’s (1964) definition of an identity as being rooted in the very core of a person’s being and involving being true to the self in action, Aquino and Reed (2002) propose that two dimensions tap into the self-importance of moral identity. The first dimension reflects the degree to which moral traits are deeply rooted in the self-concept (internalization), and the second reflects the degree to which these moral traits manifest publicly through the person’s actions in the world (symbolization). We used Aquino and Reed’s ten-item measure to assess the self-importance of moral identity (for the items, see the Appendix). Respondents answered the ten questions on Likert-type items (1 = “strongly disagree,” and 7 = “strongly agree”). The measure consists of two subscales that tap into the internalization and symbolization dimensions of moral identity. We averaged the items for each subscale. The Cronbach’s alpha reliabilities for internalization and symbolization were .79 and .76, with means of 6.28 (SD = .62) and 4.43 (SD = .95), respectively.

We measured the extent to which giving money is perceived as self-expressive by prompting participants with the following: “Hypothetically speaking, giving money in the amount you wrote down would...” We measured the following response items on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = “strongly disagree,” and 7 = “strongly agree”): “be my vol-
untary choice,” “represent the type of person that I am,” “rep-resent the kind of activity I often think about,” “be an important priority for me,” “represent 'who I am,'” and “be a natural thing for me to do.” A Varimax-rotated factor analysis showed that these items loaded onto one dimension, so we collapsed the items into an aggregate measure ($\alpha = .90$) in which higher numbers represented higher levels of self-expression.

Participants responded to the following prompt: “Hypo-thetically speaking, giving time in the amount you wrote down would...” We asked the same questions as we did for the previously discussed measure to assess the self-expressivity of the act of giving time. Again, we collapsed these measures into an aggregate score ($\alpha = .93$) on the basis of a Varimax-rotated factor analysis that showed that these items loaded onto one dimension. Because we were interested in self-expressive differences across money versus time, we used the same items to measure both and to tease them apart.

We asked participants to indicate which of the two acts was more “caring,” “moral,” “socially responsible,” and “heartfelt” by responding on a seven-point scale (1 = “giving money,” and 7 = “giving time”). We averaged these four items to form a scale ($\alpha = .72$) in which higher numbers indicated that participants perceived the act as being more moral.

We controlled for variables that were not of direct interest in the study but that might be related to attributions and perceptions of the charitable behaviors. We controlled for gender because it has been suggested that women are more oriented toward an ethic of care than men (Gilligan 1982). As a result, they may be more likely to infer stronger moral inferences in giving time. This variable was dummy coded (0 = male, and 1 = female). We controlled for age because polling data indicate that older people are more likely to be civic minded and to volunteer for community services (Putnam 2000); thus, age might influence consumers’ perceptions of giving time. We also controlled for religious participation because there is some evidence that people who attend religious services are more likely to give time to community service activities than those who do not attend (Myers 2000). Consequently, religious participation (e.g., Williams and Lawler 2001) might influence inferences about giving time versus money independently of the self-importance of moral identity. We measured this variable by asking respondents to indicate how frequently they attended a place of worship during the past year using the following response format: regularly, occasionally, only on special days (Christmas, Yom Kippur, Ramadam), and not at all. These response categories were coded 4, 3, 2, and 1, respectively, so that the higher number indicated more frequent religious participation. Finally, 16% of the sample indicated that they had some idea about or thought of the charitable organization’s costs when making their judgments of the two charitable behaviors. Thus, we controlled for this by creating a dummy-coded variable (0 = had no idea of/did not think about recipient’s costs, and 1 = had some idea of/thought about recipient’s cost).

Results

The test of $H_1$ is a t-test on the perceived morality variable. Note that participants provided their unique subjective value of their time such that the act of giving time was equivalent to giving money to the hypothetical charity of their choice. Although the two acts were equivalent in value, participants nonetheless believed that giving time was more caring, moral, socially responsible, and heartfelt ($t = 21.90, p < .05$) than giving money, consistent with prior research. The more important analysis was whether this difference would be explained by the self-importance of consumers’ moral identity ($H_2$) and whether the two acts would be differentially self-expressive as a function of moral identity. We used hierarchical regression to test $H_2$ and $H_3$. We regressed the perceived morality variable, the self-expressivity of time variable, and the self-expressivity of money variable onto the controls in Step 1. We added the internalization and symbolization subscales of moral identity in Step 2. This analysis enabled us to test the incremental variance explained by the self-importance of moral identity. Consistent with $H_2$, we found a significant effect of internalization ($\beta = .38, t = 3.58, p < .05$) on moral inferences, such that participants who were higher on the internalized dimension of the self-importance of moral identity reported that giving time (versus money), though objectively equivalent in dollar value, was more caring, moral, socially responsible, and heartfelt. We also found support for $H_3$. Participants who were high internalizers ($\beta = .47, t = 2.78, p < .05$) and who were high symbolizers ($\beta = .49, t = 4.19, p < .05$) reported stronger perceptions of giving time as being self-expressive. Although we found a significant effect of symbolization ($\beta = .39, t = 3.24, p < .05$) on participants’ self-expressivity of giving money, consistent with $H_3$, the set of internalization and symbolization variables explained twice the variance in their self-expressivity of giving time ($R^2 = .17, F = 6.94, p < .05$) compared with their self-expressivity of giving money ($R^2 = .09, F = 5.57, p < .05$).

Study 1b: The Self-Importance of Moral Identity and Perceptions of Equivalent Corporate Actions

Method

Sample and procedures. We conducted a second study to determine whether the kind of effects found in Study 1a (moral inferences) would also emerge when people judge corporations that give time versus money. The convenience sample consisted of 58 undergraduate students, administrative staff, and local community residents who participated in a one-hour session in which they were compensated $10 for completing several research tasks. Of those who reported demographics, 35 were men, 23 were Caucasian, 8 were African American, 21 were Asian, 2 were Hispanic, and 3 self-reported as “other”; their average age was 21.14 years (SD = 6.54).

The study consisted of several parts. In the first part, participants completed Aquino and Reed’s (2002) ten-item
measure of self-importance of moral identity as part of a “self-attitudes” questionnaire. There were then several unrelated filler tasks. In the main task, participants completed a “scenario” study in which they were asked to give their impressions of two hypothetical organizations that participate in charitable activities.

Similar to Study 1a, participants were presented with the following instructions, which preceded descriptions of two hypothetical organizations:

Corporation A and Corporation B each sponsor (separate) philanthropic programs in which they donate to a community outreach organization that provides free job training to unemployed workers in the local region. Though the opportunity cost (bottom-line financial cost) to each company is the same, each decides to donate in a different way.

- Corporation A, which had net profits of 20 million dollars last year, organized a program whereby it donates .5% of its net profits to the outreach organization. Thus, multiplying the net profit amount by the percentage earmarked for the outreach organization, the company donated $100,000 in cash last year. This money was spent helping to provide job training to the unemployed workers.

- Corporation B, which also had net profits of 20 million dollars last year, organized a program whereby its employees volunteered a combined 5000 hours (during working time) to the outreach organization last year. At an average employee salary of $20 an hour, Corporation B donated $100,000 in employee working hours. This time was spent helping to provide job training to the unemployed workers.

After reading these two descriptions, participants answered several questions about the two hypothetical corporations. They then completed the remaining tasks for the experimental session, were debriefed, were paid for their time, and were dismissed.

**Measures.** As in Study 1a, we administered Aquino and Reed’s (2002) ten-item measure before the corporation scenario to assess the self-importance of moral identity (see the Appendix). Respondents answered the ten questions on Likert-type scales (1 = “strongly disagree,” and 7 = “strongly agree”). We averaged the items for each subscale. The Cronbach’s alpha reliabilities for the internalization and symbolization scales were .86 and .85, with means of 6.34 (SD = .745) and 4.26 (SD = 1.18), respectively.

Participants responded to the following seven questions about the two corporations: “Which company is more caring?” “Which company is a better corporate citizen?” “Which company shows greater concern for the welfare of others?” “Which company is more socially responsible?” “Which company is more involved with its community?” “Which company is more moral?” and “Which company displays a greater social conscience?” Participants then checked one of six boxes with Corporation A at one end of the scale and Corporation B at the other end of the scale. We coded these measures such that higher scores indicated that Corporation B was viewed as possessing more favorable reactions with respect to the items we measured. A Varimax-rotated factor analysis showed that these items loaded on one dimension. We averaged them to form a scale (α = .93).

As an additional, nonmoral proxy of the extent to which people value and protect their time, we wrote seven questions to measure participants’ perceptions of their own time. Participants responded to the following statements on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = “strongly disagree,” and 7 = strongly agree”): “I always use my time to ‘get things done’”; “Only lazy people spend their time doing nonproductive things”; “I do not squander away my time”; “It is quite OK to spend your time doing ‘nothing’” (reverse coded); “Time is my most important resource”; “In general, I would say I’m the type of person who values my time”; and “Time is one of the most important resources that I personally have.” A Varimax-rotated factor analysis showed that these items loaded onto a single dimension. We averaged them to form a scale (α = .84). We used the same control variables in Study 1a as in Study 2b.

**Results**

As in Study 1a, we tested whether the self-importance of moral identity predicts the likelihood that participants would view the hypothetical organization that gave time as being more caring, socially responsible, moral, and so forth. We regressed the dependent variable onto gender, age, and religious participation in Step 1. In Step 2, we entered internalization, symbolization, and people’s own perceptions of the value of their time into the model. There was a significant effect in the regression for the internalization variable (β = .41, p < .05), indicating that higher scores on the internalization measure were positively correlated with higher perceptions of Corporation B (the time-giving corporation) as being more caring, being a better corporate citizen, showing greater concern for the welfare of others, being more socially responsible, being more involved with its community, being more moral, and having a greater social conscience. Symbolization and the value of time had no impact. Neither did any of the control variables.

**Discussion and Limitations of Studies 1a and 1b**

Study 1b showed similar results to those we found in Study 1a. We showed that the self-importance of moral identity (as measured by the internalization dimension) is related not only to self-reinforcing attributions made about the subjectively equivalent act of giving time versus money but also to inferences drawn about the moral activities of corporations. We also showed that this inference is not due to people’s general perception that their time is highly valuable; the measure of people’s general motivation to “protect” their time had no impact in the analysis. In addition, we explicitly told participants that the financial costs to the two organizations were identical, moving toward resolving the issue as to whether the participants intuitively understand value as defined by economic opportunity costs. Notably, as in Study 1a, the symbolization dimension in Study 1b did not affect participants’ perceptions of which corporation was relatively more caring.
Although Studies 1a and 1b provide preliminary evidence for the theoretical arguments outlined in this article, several limitations still apply. The data suggest that consumers whose self-conception is relatively more organized around a set of moral traits will infer stronger perceived morality regarding the behavior of both individuals and corporations and will psychologically identify (i.e., perceive the behavior as more self-expressive). However, this does not necessarily mean that the self-importance of moral identity will be related to consumers’ actual preferences for donating time versus money. An important extension of the implications of the perceptions of giving time versus money is to examine the influence of a consumer’s self-important moral identity on preferences and behavioral intentions to engage in the two acts and to examine boundary conditions of these preferences.

Moreover, Studies 1a and 1b were both lab studies and, to some extent, are unable to tap into the complexities of real-life decision making. For example, we stated previously that an important issue in the marketing of organizational brand identity is how to encourage employees to give of themselves through voluntary acts that strengthen ties between their companies and the community. Although this goal is socially laudable, it presents a conundrum for many consumers because they occupy multiple social roles in life (e.g., parent, employee, Protestant, civic leader), each having a unique set of expectations and time commitments. It is likely that from time to time, the role expectations and corresponding self-identities attached to various consumer social positions conflict. Even when direct conflict among role expectations is absent, consumers must decide how to allocate personal resources of effort and money. If such an issue were examined in a more complex field setting, the results could provide additional evidence regarding the external validity of the arguments in this article and also could establish a preliminary boundary condition on the impact of moral identity’s self-importance on preferences for charitable behaviors.

Study 2: Effects of the Self-Importance of Moral Identity on Preferences for Charitable Behaviors

In a recent article drawing on Jackall’s (1988) study of moral behavior in organizations, Weaver and Agle (2002) suggest that the more numerous and important consumers’ work-related commitments based on their organizational role, the stronger is their organizational identity relative to other identities. In contrast, people with less important and fewer commitments based on their organizational role will be less likely to act on organizational role expectations when such expectations conflict with role expectations and norms based on their other identities. On the basis of this reasoning, Weaver and Agle conclude that though people at the top of an organizational hierarchy have greater freedom to define organizational role expectations and, therefore, greater freedom to be guided by certain identities (e.g., religious identity), consumers with higher organizational status paradoxically have less psychological capacity to act on these values than people in the organizational periphery, who have fewer and/or weaker organization-based commitments.

If this thesis is valid, it is reasonable to suggest that consumers at the top of the organization, who are more likely to have a stronger organizational identity, will be more psychologically committed to achieving organizational or career goals than to pursuing civic or community-based goals that may be consistent with their other identities. This argument is consistent with Frederick’s (1995) observation that values of economizing and power aggrandizing often found in business organizations can dominate an employee’s personal values. Furthermore, as consumers rise through the organization and receive higher salaries, the value of their time increases, and it becomes less “rational” to spend it on anything other than making money (Linder 1970). Finally, it may be that as a person’s psychic energy becomes invested in achieving material or career success, his or her sensitivity to other rewards, such as helping others, begins to atrophy (Csikszentmihalyi 1999).

These conditions present powerful psychological barriers against volunteerism among high-status organizational members and make the donation of money more attractive. First, unlike writing a check, volunteerism takes time, and time tends to be a scare resource for busy, ambitious people who make a lot of money and who have multiple organizational commitments. Second, if people who advance to the highest levels of the organization get there by devoting most of their energy to their careers, it is conceivable that their sensitivity to rewards that might be gained from voluntary service may atrophy, as Csikszentmihalyi (1999) suggests. Finally, even when high-ranking people have leisure time that they might reasonably devote to community service, their organizational identities may be so overpowering that they devote that time to career-related goals, such as playing golf with people even higher up in the organization, attending industry conferences, or socializing with important clients. As a result, they cannot devote time to civic goals, such as volunteering at the local soup kitchen or being a Boy Scout leader. Thus, we propose that the consumers who are most likely to prefer donating money to offering voluntary services when opportunity costs are held constant are those who occupy high-level positions in organizations. The following hypothesis tests this prediction:

H4: When the value of the two resources is held constant, the higher an employee’s organizational status, the more likely he or she is to prefer giving money to volunteering time to an organization that renders a social good.

However, as we mentioned previously, because consumers possess multiple identities, it is conceivable that if a person’s moral identity has sufficiently high self-importance, it may neutralize or even dominate the organizational role identity of high-status employees. If so, not only will moral identity have a direct effect on the preference of working adults to volunteer rather than to donate money to organizations that provide a social good, but the self-importance of moral identity might also mitigate the effect of organizational status that H4 predicts. Accordingly,
we propose that having high organizational status will not lead employees to prefer giving money to volunteering time if their moral identity has high rather than low self-importance; this is an important implication of differential preferences for giving time versus money that were established in testing core ideas about the self-importance of moral identity and judgments of giving time versus money. The following hypothesis tests this prediction:

\[ H_5: \text{When the value of the two resources is held constant, moral identity moderates the relationship between organizational status and the preference for giving money rather than volunteering, such that the relationship is weaker for people whose moral identity has high rather than low self-importance.} \]

**Method**

**Sample and procedure.** The convenience sample consisted of adult community residents located throughout the United States. The community residents were all alumni of the College of Business and Economics at a mid-Atlantic university. The college’s alumni office provided a list of names and contact information for 927 alumni. Mail surveys were sent to people on the list who reported a U.S. address. The measure of self-importance of moral identity was part of a more comprehensive survey assessment that included several other measures that were not of direct interest in the current research. The survey included a cover letter that explained that the purpose of the study was to assess people’s beliefs about engaging in certain activities. The letter informed respondents that all answers to the survey would remain anonymous and confidential. Three hundred sixty-one participants returned their surveys. We analyzed only the responses of 310 alumni who reported working full time because they were the most likely to experience the conflict between moral identity and career commitments. The remaining respondents reported working either part time (n = 27) or not at all (n = 24). Of the full-time employees who reported demographics, 73% were women, and nearly all (96%) were Caucasian. Their average age was 41 years (SD = 9.6), and they averaged 19 years (SD = 10.0) of work experience. Of the respondents, 30% reported working in executive-level positions, 17% were upper-level managers, 27% were mid-level managers, 4% were first-level supervisors, and 21% were nonmanagerial employees. Of the 310 full-time alumni, 274 provided usable data on all study variables, for a 30% response rate.

**Establishing a context.** We presented the choice of giving time versus money to a community service organization to participants by initially asking them a series of questions that provided a context in which we could assess their preferences. First, they estimated and wrote down how much “free time” they had during an average week, with which they could “realistically” spend volunteering for some kind of community service activity. Second, they estimated and wrote down their hourly salary and multiplied this number by the amount of free time they reported in the first question. This step was designed to make the opportunity costs of giving time in monetary units salient. Finally, they chose which of three options they would prefer: (1) to give the free time they wrote in the first question to their favorite community service organization, (2) to write that organization a check for the amount of money they calculated after multiplying the amount of free time they had by their hourly salary, or (3) neither. Participants were told that they could choose only one option. The choice scenario used in Study 2 accounts for each participant’s strict economic opportunity costs and time availability. Thus, there was considerably greater variability in the opportunity costs of giving time in Study 2, though the relative value of time versus money was still held constant for each respondent.

**Measures.** We measured the construct of giving time versus money by the respondent’s self-reported preference to volunteer time, donate money, or do neither. We used Aquino and Reed’s (2002) ten-item measure to assess the self-importance of moral identity. Cronbach’s alpha reliabilities for the internalization and symbolization subscales were .70 and .8, respectively (see the Appendix). We measured the organizational status variable by asking respondents to report their job level using the following categories coded 1–5, respectively: nonmanagerial, first-level supervisor, midlevel manager, upper-level manager, and executive-level manager. For reasons we described in the previous studies, we also controlled for gender (0 = male, and 1 = female), age, and religious participation. In addition, we controlled for impression management by including items from Paulhus’s (1991) measure of this construct (α = .80).

**Results.** We used multinomial logistic regression to test the study hypotheses because the choice options were unordered and binary. We treated giving money as the reference category in the regression; thus, the relevant contrasts are between service and giving money and between doing neither (not donating) and giving money. We centered the two dimensions of the self-importance of moral identity and the organizational status variable before creating the interaction term to minimize multicollinearity between the interactions and their individual components (Aiken and West 1991). The likelihood ratio test revealed significant effects for impression management (χ² = 7.85, p < .05), symbolization (χ² = 14.79, p < .01), organizational status (χ² = 9.66, p < .01), and the internalization × status interaction (χ² = 6.63, p < .05). The parameter estimates for the choice contrasts (service versus money and neither versus money) showed that people who scored higher in impression management were less likely to choose neither than money (β = −1.21, p < .01). The symbolization dimension had a significant effect on the likelihood of choosing service over money (β = .61, p < .05) and a marginally significant, negative effect on choosing neither over money (β = −.66, p < .10). These results are consistent with the theoretical argument in this article that the self-importance of moral identity affects consumers’ preferences for giving time over money, even when the two resources are equal in value.

We predicted that consumers with high organizational status would prefer giving money to giving time, and indeed the negative parameter estimate for the organizational status variable on the likelihood of choosing service over money
supports this prediction ($\beta = -0.38, p < 0.01$). For every one level that employees advance in the organizational hierarchy (i.e., from nonmanagerial, to first-level supervisor, to midlevel manager, to upper-level manager, and finally to executive-level manager) the odds of preferring giving time versus money when opportunity costs are constant decrease by 29%, in support of our predictions. However, the main effect of organizational status is qualified by the significant internalization $\times$ organizational status interaction we reported previously.

We theorized that the self-importance of moral identity would moderate the effect of organizational status such that the preference for giving money rather than volunteering would be weaker for consumers whose moral identity has high self-importance than for those whose moral identity has low self-importance. The significant parameter estimates for the internalization $\times$ organizational status interaction on the contrast between service and money provide initial support for this prediction ($\beta = 0.63, p < 0.05$). We also found a significant interaction effect on the contrast between neither and money ($\beta = 1.01, p < 0.05$).

We analyzed the form of these interactions by performing a multinomial regression on organizational status within groups that scored high versus low on the internalization measure. We determined group assignment by a median split on this measure. The results showed that organizational status was significant for low ($\chi^2 = 9.38, p < 0.01$) but not for high ($\chi^2 = 2.63$, not significant) moral identifiers. The parameter estimates for the choice contrasts in the low-moral-identity group showed that people with higher organizational status were less likely to choose service over giving money ($\beta = -0.47, p < 0.01$) and were marginally less likely to choose neither over money ($\beta = -0.47, p < 0.06$). To depict this pattern of results, Figure 2 graphs the number of participants who chose to give time, money, or neither as a function of organizational status and moral identity (i.e., their internalization scores). These results are consistent with our predictions because consumers whose moral identity had high self-importance did not show a significantly greater preference for giving money over time as their organizational status increased.

**Discussion and Limitations of Study 2**

Study 2 suggests that the self-importance of moral identity is a promising construct for explaining preferences to give time versus money; an interpretation of this finding is that having a highly self-important moral identity may act as a countervailing force to the organizational commitments associated with a high-status position. A critical limitation of our conclusions is that the self-importance of moral identity may not play a causal role. Although prior research has painstakingly tried to validate the psychometric properties of the measure we use in these studies (e.g., Aquino and Reed 2002; Reed and Aquino 2003; Reed et al. 2006), as with any research whose focal independent variables are individual difference measures, it is entirely possible that the self-importance of moral identity is correlated with other, unobserved causal variables that produce the effect regarding perceptions of and preferences for the giving of time versus money. Study 2 attempted to rule this out by examining a logically consistent moderating variable (organizational status); however, perhaps the most compelling way to “rule in” the causal role of the self-importance of moral identity would be an orthogonal experiment in which moral identity is manipulated. For example, participants’ moral identities could be primed, and then participants could be asked whether they would prefer to donate time or money in various situations. Similar to Studies 1a, 1b, and 2, we predict that people with a highly salient moral identity will be more likely to donate time, particularly when that time is being given to an organization whose main goal is to assist in the needs of others (i.e., a moral goal).
conducted Study 3 to address these three limitations and to test the following hypothesis:

H₃: When the value of the two resources is held constant, participants whose moral identity is primed are more likely to prefer giving time than giving money. This effect is more likely to occur when the time is being donated on behalf of a moral purpose.

**Study 3: Priming Moral Identity and Assessing Preferences for Giving Time Versus Money**

The purpose of Study 3 was to provide a causal test of the effect of moral identity on preferences for giving time versus money. Thus, we made moral identity either more or less salient and observed whether this affected self-reported preferences to give time or money to a charitable or non-charitable organization.

**Method**

**Sample and procedures.** The convenience sample consisted of 179 undergraduate students, administrative staff, and local area community residents who participated in a one-hour session in which they were compensated for completing several research tasks. Of those who reported demographics, 79 were men; 44% were Caucasian, 13% were African American, 31% were Asian, 6% were Hispanic, and 6% self-reported as “other”; their average age was 22 years (SD = 5.82).

The study consisted of four parts. For Task 1, participants completed a short prequestionnaire about people’s perceptions of their “busy-ness.” Task 2 was a general-opinion survey in which we measured their impression management tendencies. Task 3 was a “handwriting” study, and Task 4 was a “donation request” study. After completing these four tasks, participants were paid $10 for their time; they were thanked, debriefed, and dismissed. We describe each of these tasks in more detail next.

**Measures.** We attempted to prime participants’ moral identities in the third handwriting task presented in the lab session. Participants were told that “the purpose of the exercise is to examine people’s handwriting styles as they tell stories.” Participants were given a 9 × 5 matrix that contained nine words listed in each row in the first column. The participants were asked to write down (in their own handwriting) the nine words across the remaining four columns such that each participant wrote down the nine words four separate times. On the next page, participants were told to “take a few moments to think about each of these words. In the box below, write a brief story about yourself (in one or two paragraphs) which uses each of these words at least once. It may help you if you visualize each word as it is relevant to your life.” Participants then completed manipulation checks and other unrelated questions that served to bolster the handwriting cover story. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In the low-moral-prime condition, the nine words were “book,” “car,” “chair,” “computer,” “desk,” “pen,” “street,” “table,” and “trash can.” In the high-moral-prime condition, the nine words were the salient induction stimuli in Aquino and Reed’s (2002) instrument: “caring,” “compassionate,” “fair,” “friendly,” “generous,” “helpful,” “hardworking,” “honest,” and “kind” (see the Appendix).

Immediately following the handwriting task, participants completed the donation-request study. They were told that for a future study, the lab had been contacted by organizations to assess people’s perceptions of and desire to volunteer different kinds of resources to help fundraising efforts. Participants were asked to imagine that they would come to the lab and be faced with the following hypothetical choices:

- You can donate $_____. (Imagine that after this session you would simply give to an organization some of the cash you will be compensated for participating in today’s session.)
- You can donate $_____. value of your time. (Imagine that after this session you would be taken to another classroom where you would spend time stuffing envelopes on behalf of the organization.)
- You can choose to do neither. (Imagine that after this session you would simply be compensated and you would then be free to leave.)

Participants were told to “please keep in mind that there is no right or wrong answer.” They were told that they should not feel obligated to donate money or time to the particular effort. They were also told that “for this data to be useful, it’s important that you simply report your true preferences. For example, choosing the third option is perfectly acceptable.” They were then told to choose one of the aforementioned options. We coded their reported choices as follows: 1 = do not give, 2 = give cash, and 3 = give time.

On the next page, participants then responded to open-ended questions that asked them to briefly describe their reasons for the hypothetical choices that they made on the prior page. Finally, participants were asked questions to assess their perceptions of the organization for which they decided to not give, to give money, or to give time.

For the hypothetical donation study, participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions that manipulated the kind of organization they were considering for their hypothetical choices. In the low-moral-organization condition, the organization was the American Marketing Association. Before making their choice, they were told that any provision of resources (money or time) would assist the American Marketing Association in its ongoing efforts to produce high-quality marketing resources for marketing professionals. In the high-moral-organization condition, the organization was the American Red Cross. Before participants made their choice, they were told that any provision of resources (money or time) would assist the American Red Cross in its ongoing efforts to respond to the needs of others who require aid and assistance.

As a replicate, we also manipulated the amount of money that would be given to the organization. In the low-resource condition, participants made the choice of not donating, giving $3 cash to the organization, or giving $3 worth of their time to the organization. In the high-resource condition, participants made the choice of not donating, giving $5 cash to the organization, or giving $5 worth of their time to the organization. We did this because partici-
pants were being asked hypothetically to consider choosing to donate a portion of the $10 they would receive after completion of the research tasks. Participants were randomly assigned to one of these two conditions.

As in our previous studies, we measured gender, age, and religious participation as control variables with the same coding scheme as in Study 2. In Task 1 of the study, we collected measures of and controlled for people’s general value of their time by asking them the same seven items from Study 1b. The Cronbach’s alpha for this variable was .72. In Task 2 of the study, we collected Paulhus’s (1991) impression management measure to attempt to control for socially desirable responding (α = .79). Higher numbers on this variable reflect a stronger propensity to respond with a socially desirable answer.

**Results**

To check on the moral-prime condition, we asked participants some cover story questions about the stories they wrote in the handwriting task. We asked them about the extent to which the story they wrote reflected how they view themselves as (1) a student, (2) a member of an organization, (3) a moral person, and (4) safety conscious. We submitted each of these items to an analysis that contained the main effect of the moral-prime condition and the control variables. This analysis showed that participants in the high-moral-prime condition reported that their stories significantly reflected how they view themselves as a moral person to a greater extent than those in the low-moral-prime condition (Moral-prime conditionHIGH = 5.12; F(1, 159) = 77.30, p < .05). We also found an effect of impression management such that participants who scored higher on socially desirable responding also reported that their stories were relatively more reflective of them being moral. No other effects were significant.

We included two questions to ensure that participants believed that if they hypothetically decided to give money or time to the American Red Cross, their efforts would be perceived as going toward an organization with a moral purpose. At the end of the donation study, we asked participants, “In this specific example, (giving money or time to ____), to what extent did you think that giving time or money would be going to a moral cause?” and “In this specific example, (giving money or time to ____), to what extent did you think that giving time or money would help others in need?” Respondents answered the two questions on Likert-type items (1 = “strongly disagree,” and 7 = “strongly agree”). We averaged these two questions to form a reliable scale (α = .91). We submitted this analysis to a model that contained the control variables, the main effects and all possible higher-order interactions of the moral-prime manipulation, the moral-organization manipulation, and the amount-of-resources manipulation. The only significant effect was a main effect of the moral-organization manipulation (F(1, 153) = 161.33, p < .05), such that participants in the American Red Cross condition believed that their resources would be going to a moral organization that assisted in helping others who were in need (Moral-organization conditionLOW = 2.23, Moral-organization conditionHIGH = 5.22).

We submitted the control variables and the main effects and all possible higher-order interactions of the moral-prime condition, the moral-organization condition, and the amount-of-resources condition as predictor variables of the choice not to donate (1), to give cash (2), or to give time (3). As in Study 1a, we used multinomial regression because these three options are nonordered categorical responses. The overall maximum likelihood ratio test revealed significant effects for gender ($\chi^2 = 10.63, p < .05$), the moral-organization manipulation ($\chi^2 = 67.69, p < .05$), and the moral-identity prime × moral-organization two-way interaction ($\chi^2 = 7.17, p < .05$).

We then examined the parameter estimates for the three exhaustive binary contrasts of the dependent measure. Overall, men were 4.2 times more likely to choose not to donate than to give time ($\chi^2 = 9.02, p < .05$), and low-moral-organization participants were 4.3 times more likely not to donate than to give time ($\chi^2 = 21.86, p < .05$). In addition, the choice probability contrasts showed that participants in the low-moral-prime condition were 5.7 times more likely to choose giving cash than giving time ($\chi^2 = 6.40, p < .05$). As we mentioned previously, these effects were qualified by the higher-order moral-identity prime × moral-organization interaction. To explore the moral-identity prime × moral-organization interaction, we estimated two separate multinomial logit models within the low-moral-organization (American Marketing Association) and the high-moral-organization (American Red Cross) conditions. These two models contained the control variables and the main effect of the moral-identity-prime manipulation. We found no statistically significant choice contrasts in the low-moral-organization condition; however, in the high-moral-organization condition, we found a significant moral-identity effect ($\chi^2 = 7.26, p < .05$). We examined the choice contrasts and found that men in the high-moral-organization condition were 4.3 times more likely to choose not to donate than to give time ($\beta = 1.47, \chi^2 = 3.96, p < .05$). We also found that being in the high-moral-organization condition of the high-moral-organization condition increased the likelihood that participants would choose to give time over money by 458% ($\beta = -1.719, \chi^2 = 6.08, p < .05$). In Figure 3, we graphed the number of people who chose to give time, to give cash, or not to donate as a function of the moral-prime and moral-organization manipulations. The pattern shows that the main effect of the moral-organization manipulation is heightened by the moral-prime condition such that when moral identity is primed, participants self-report a greater propensity to give time than to give money, but this is the case only when the organization is a moral organization that assists in being responsive to the social needs of other people. This pattern emerges. Even when we control for age, gender, religious participation, impression management, and participants’ general perceptions of the value of their time (as in Study 1b).

**Discussion of Study 3**

Study 3 builds on our previous studies by providing causal evidence for the effect of moral identity on preferences for giving time versus money. Study 3 also bolsters our argument that these preferences emerge because of the self-
Moral Identity and Judgments of Charitable Behaviors / 189

Notes: High moral identity is the condition in which the moral self was primed.

General Discussion

Consumers may differ in their perceptions of and intentions to engage in various types of philanthropic behavior. The impact of identity on reactions to giving time and giving money is crucial from the points of view of potential donors, charitable and for-profit organizations, and society at large (Reed, Aquino, and Levy 2007). Thus, by examining how consumer reactions to donating time versus money affects both individual charitable giving intentions and perceptions of corporate philanthropy, the package of studies we presented herein makes a unique contribution to both social psychology and marketing. However, an important question is how organizations can use this knowledge to enhance brand and company identification and promote goodwill through the facilitation of community relations. We propose several ways that both charities and for-profit organizations can do so, and we highlight some theoretical conundrums about donating time versus money that may provide opportunities for further empirical study.

Consider the guidance that this set of studies gives to a manager of a charitable organization. A charity’s goals consist largely of soliciting donations of time and money from consumers and organizations to help people in need. Study 1a establishes that high moral identifiers are more likely to choose to donate time rather than money to a charity, and Study 1b extends this effect to identification with the actions of hypothetical organizations. These findings have several important implications. First, charitable organizations should have explicit strategies for soliciting donations of both time and money because consumer perceptions and motivations may differ for each type of giving. In constructing such a strategy, charities should identify their specific needs of time and money for particular campaigns, create organizational structures to serve these needs, and target an appropriate consumer audience to achieve these goals.

A suitable organizational structure may entail having different people or subunits in charge of soliciting time and money and using separate budgets for the execution of each strategy. Employees in each unit would preferably have a particular interest in procuring either time or money, resulting from either individual differences (such as their own moral identity) or characteristics of their professional background. In targeting an appropriate consumer audience, charities could attempt to solicit time from people who are more likely to possess a highly self-important moral identity. This may involve identifying people who belong to organizations that are considered moral (e.g., a church organization, the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals), people who already give time (e.g., Big Brothers/Big Sisters), purchasers of products that are known for social responsibility (e.g., Ben & Jerry’s ice cream), viewers of television shows or magazines with moral themes, and partnerships with corporations that either have a moral image or may be looking to adopt this image.

Second, how consumers can go about donating time and subsequent donations of time should be explicitly linked to reinforcing properties of giving time rather than money (as in Study 1a). We found that the self-importance of moral identity heightens the preference for giving time, especially when giving time benefits an organization that professes moral goals. Study 3 also rules out the possibility that other, nonmoral-related aspects (e.g., mere impression management, making friends at the volunteer facility, learning more about the organization) are driving the results. Finally, Study 3 provides additional evidence that the effect is bounded by efforts that reinforce moral properties of the self (activities and organizations whose goals are to respond to the needs of others).
the needs of the organization and should be clearly communicated through a charity’s advertisements and solicitations. Charities want high moral identifiers to know whether time, and not just money, is needed to achieve their intended goals. This is particularly so because people who are most likely to engage in charitable giving may be more likely to express moral action that shows responsiveness to the needs of others (Gilligan 1982; Kohlberg 1969; Rest 1979). If a charitable organization needs donations of money to achieve its goals, it may want to emphasize (particularly to high moral identifiers) how this money will enable the charity to give time to help those less fortunate. Doing so may help activate the morality of the time dimension rather than focus on the amount of money given. Such a circumstance might arise in which money is needed to train specialized personnel, for the purchase of equipment, or for other instances in which direct consumer donations of time would be less useful. For example, medical personnel may need specialized equipment to treat people who are infected with diseases in third-world countries, and money for food, electricity, and so forth, may be needed. Likewise, victims of a hurricane may need money to purchase food and shelter.

Web sites provide at least one way to emphasize the giving of time. For example, the United Way prominently displays a “Volunteer” button above the “Donate” button on its Web site. The American Red Cross seems to emphasize the giving of money more on its site and gives personal examples of people who have contributed large amounts of money (but not time). However, most of the Red Cross’s volunteering is done through local chapters, and links are provided from its Web site. The homepages of these local chapters emphasize volunteering to a greater degree, though they also note the positive moral benefits of giving money. For example, the Seattle American Red Cross Web site states (see http://www.seattleredcross.org/helpnow/index.htm), “By making a gift to the American Red Cross, we are enabled to provide assistance to people in need here in our communities…. [Y]our contribution means a great deal to the families who rely on the Red Cross to help them through some of the most difficult times of their lives.” This statement makes the point that if a consumer gives money, others who work for the organization will be able to give time to help those in need.

Third, Study 3 indicates that charitable organizations may be able to affect donations of time versus money by exposing consumers to a morally relevant prime in an advertisement or a solicitation. For example, an advertisement could state, “You probably consider yourself a caring, compassionate, hardworking person, and the American Red Cross could really use your help in volunteering your time to project X which serves the less fortunate,” or it could use a visual image of others donating to convey this effect. Charities can use a moral-identity prime in various contexts to affect the degree to which consumers self-identify with actions that reflect more investment of the self. Indeed, an organization that is not typically considered a charity may also be able to encourage the donation of time through the use of a prime. For example, a noncharitable organization that engages in a charitable drive (e.g., the Professional Golf Association Tour of America’s “Drive to a Billion” campaign, the Ronald McDonald House charities) could potentially be perceived as possessing similar moral characteristics as an organization that is charitable.

Although for-profit organizations can use the same strategies as nonprofits in certain instances, they also have additional concerns about corporate reputation and building brand equity. If a corporation’s employees donate time and if this contribution can be effectively linked in consumers’ minds to the organization’s identity and its products, this may result in increased reputation and brand equity effects. Recent research suggests that corporate philanthropy can generate positive moral capital among communities and stakeholders and that this moral capital contributes to shareholder wealth through acting as insurance-like protection of a firm’s relationship-based intangible assets (Godfrey 2005). Other research shows that consumers’ associations of corporate social responsibility affect product perceptions independently of associations of corporate ability (Dacin and Brown 1997). Our studies suggest that donations of time can amplify each of these effects. Moreover, donating time may have intraorganizational effects on employees as well. We address these issues in turn.

Study 1b finds that high moral identifiers are more likely to relate to organizations that donate time rather than money, suggesting that a company’s organization donation program can affect employee morale, job satisfaction, and intent to stay with the organization. This is because people are likely to be recruited by and seek to work for organizations that are perceived as a good mutual “fit” (Chatman 1991). This effect may be particularly true for high-status employees who also possess a highly self-important moral identity, as in Study 2. Being able to act in accordance with values may make these people more satisfied by being able to give time rather than money, counteracting the time-constraint effects of organizational status. Thus, if an organization adopts a donation program in which higher-level employees are able to give time, the company could operate more efficiently and profitably because it is particularly disrupting and costly to replace these employees if they leave the organization. Research has also found that MBA graduates of top schools may be willing to accept a lower starting salary to work for a company that is more socially responsible (Montgomery and Ramus 2003).

Furthermore, because a corporation is often considered a reflection of its top managers (Hambrick and Mason 1984), executive commitment to a time-donation program may have a “trickle-down” effect to employees at lower levels of the organization. Lower-level employees may begin to believe that investment of the self through giving time is an important part of the organizational culture and that this mind-set should be adopted. This process could operate through contagion (Barsade 2002), through the desire to conform to organizational norms, or through other means. Indeed, recent research has shown that moral development and actions of corporate leaders can affect employee attitudes and moral behaviors (Schminke, Ambrose, and Neubaum 2005). Thus, there are ample opportunities for employees of high organizational status to set the tone for the moral actions of the rest of the organization by emphasizing the benefits of donating time.
For marketing managers of for-profit organizations, there are at least three distinct ways to increase brand equity through consumers’ differential reactions to giving time versus money. First, managers should consider the “type” of brand a company possesses (e.g., its brand personality; see Aaker 1997) and determine whether this brand would benefit from associations of corporate donations of time. Certain brands may be viewed as possessing more “moral” associations or may already be known for their corporate social responsibility (e.g., Ben & Jerry’s ice cream). Donation of corporate time may be particularly relevant to purchasers of these brands because of their identification with the investment of self made by the organization’s employees (as in Study 1b). Conversely, donation of time could help a less typically well-regarded organization (e.g., a tobacco company) increase its perceived moral relevance.

Second, managers can use advertising, which could emphasize the link between a brand and the donation of company time to charitable causes, thus generating the transfer of more positive attitudes toward the brand (Brown, Homer, and Inman 1998; Burke and Edell 1989). Study 3 suggests that if the advertisement presents a strong enough moral prime so that consumers’ moral identities are “activated,” these positive brand perceptions should generalize to consumers beyond those who possess an inherently highly self-important moral identity. However, brand managers must also be cautious about appearing opportunistic in self-promoting their company’s charitable deeds. If consumers make this negative inference, any positive brand equity effects may be lost. For example, a recent “Truth” television advertisement derided a tobacco company for donating $125,000 to a charitable cause and then spending more than $21 million to advertise its generosity. This apparent opportunism on the part of the company in spending 168 times as much on advertising its generosity relative to the donation itself would likely not result in generating much goodwill among its customers and the public.

Third, marketers can benefit from and attempt to manage the positive word of mouth (e.g., Balter and Butman 2005; Brown et al. 2005) and goodwill that accrue in the communities in which the company donates time. The benefits here may be particularly great for large companies with offices in multiple cities and/or major cities, thus increasing the number of consumers that can be reached through donating time. Key managerial strategies in this instance are to maximize the positive interactions between employees and the community organization (by ensuring that employees understand and enjoy their roles and, perhaps, inviting citizens in the community to join in the donation effort) and to generate positive press coverage of the events (by contacting local media and other civic organizations). Note that, ideally, each of these three strategies (brand personality, advertising, and word of mouth) should work together as part of the marketing mix to form a coherent strategy that attracts consumers to the brand as a result of the company’s donation of time to charitable causes.

Conclusions

Answering the question of what determines a person’s preferences to give time rather than money is difficult because role and occupational commitments impose varying social and economic costs on consumers who would otherwise prefer to give their time. Furthermore, consumers have idiosyncratic opportunity costs that may enter into their decision of how to best serve the public good. These observations highlight relatively unstudied questions in marketing; namely, how do individual, psychological, and situational factors influence the way consumers evaluate the desirability to either donate money or donate time for community service? The potential psychological ambivalence of how to give may be particularly acute in moral decision-making situations, in which being true to the moral self may be disadvantageous or require the sacrifice of other life or personal career goals. At the same time, the salience and self-importance of moral identity may be at least one internal mechanism that motivates some consumers to do rather than to pay.

APPENDIX

Moral Identity Measure

Listed below are some characteristics that might describe a person:

Caring, Compassionate, Fair, Friendly, Generous, Helpful, Hardworking, Honest, Kind

The person with these characteristics could be you or it could be someone else. For a moment, visualize in your mind the kind of person who has these characteristics. Imagine how that person would think, feel, and act. When you have a clear image of what this person would be like, answer the following questions.

I 1. It would make me feel good to be a person who has these characteristics.
I 2. Being someone who has these characteristics is an important part of who I am.
S 3. I often wear clothes that identify me as having these characteristics.
I 4. I would be ashamed to be a person who had these characteristics. (R)
S 5. The types of things I do in my spare time (e.g., hobbies) clearly identify me as having these characteristics.
S 6. The kinds of books and magazines that I read identify me as having these characteristics.
I 7. Having these characteristics is not really important to me. (R)
S 8. The fact that I have these characteristics is communicated to others by my membership in certain organizations.
S 9. I am actively involved in activities that communicate to others that I have these characteristics.
I 10. I strongly desire to have these characteristics.

Notes: I = internalization, S = symbolization, and R = reverse coded.
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